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This article interrogates the position of Accra as an ‘extra-metropolitan’ centre for 
southern African anti-colonial nationalists and anti-apartheid activists during the 
so-called ‘first wave’ of Africa’s decolonization. Drawn to Ghana by a narrative 
of decolonization and continental pan-Africanism that was at once peaceful and 
revolutionary, southern African ‘Freedom Fighters’ and expatriates first traveled 
to the Ghanaian capital of Accra in anticipation of the 1958 All-African Peoples 
Conference. Inside Ghana, southern African parties including the ANC and NDP and 
later the PAC, ZAPU and ZANU worked with the government of Kwame Nkrumah’s 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) in establishing an anti-colonial policy that spoke 
both to the unique settler situation in the region and the heightening international 
tensions of the emergent Cold War – a transnational dialogue to which the Nkrumah 
administration was not always receptive. As such, this article argues that the south-
ern African presence in Accra and the realities of settler rule in the region challenged 
Nkrumah’s and others’ faith in the ‘Ghanaian’ model of decolonization, thus leading 
to a radicalization of African anti-colonial politics in Ghana during the early and 
mid-1960s as Nkrumah and his allies faced the prospect of the continent’s ‘failed’ 
decolonization.
Introduction
In October 1958 the AnC activist, writer and schoolteacher Alfred hutchinson fur-
tively boarded a train in Johannesburg and began an arduous escape from the South 
African apartheid state.1 fresh from his acquittal on treason charges and seeking to 
elude reprosecution, hutchinson set his sights northwards towards the newly inde-
pendent state of Ghana. Titling the autobiographical account of his exodus Road to 
Ghana, hutchinson coupled a dramatic picture of the hardship and indignities of 
life under white rule with the hope and excitement associated with Ghana’s 1957 
independence.2 more than a mere transfer of power from the British colonial ad-
ministration to an African elite, Ghana’s independence signalled to the international 
community the rise of a new Africa – an independent Africa ready to assert itself as 
an equal on the world stage. for southern African activists like hutchinson, caught in 
an entrenched settler situation that appeared to be closing in around them, Ghanaian 
independence did not only provide a source of inspiration and motivation as they 
confronted their own struggles at home. more importantly, through the moral and 
1 The author would like to thank Christopher lee for inviting him to contribute to this collection and Tshepo masango Chéry for 
her assistance in introducing him to mid-century southern African politics. he would also like to thank Kronos’s anonymous 
reviewer for her/his comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.
2 Alfred hutchinson, Road to Ghana (new york: The John Day Company, 1960).
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material support elicited by the Ghanaian Prime minister (and, after 1960, President) 
Kwame nkrumah, Ghana offered them a venue from which to organize, collaborate, 
and negotiate their future in dialogue with anti-colonial movements and nationalist 
parties from throughout the continent.
 As the first black-led, sub-Saharan state to emerge from colonial rule, the inde-
pendence of Ghana was a watershed moment in twentieth-century Africa. repre-
senting an idealized path to African self-rule, the Ghanaian model of decolonization 
appeared to outsiders as peaceful, democratic and orderly. And, compared to much 
of the rest of the continent, it largely was.3 The result was an unparalleled optimism 
both inside and outside the continent about what Ghana’s independence meant to 
the future of Africa and Africa’s place in the burgeoning post-war international com-
munity. In the months leading up to and for years following the country’s indepen-
dence, African and non-African radicals and activists alike trekked to the Ghanaian 
capital of Accra, where they sought to take part in what many saw as an emerging 
continent-wide liberation movement. While in Accra, these activists and would-be 
freedom fighters4 set out to define the direction, institutions, and ambitions of an in-
dependent Africa, debating along the way issues ranging from the role of violence in 
the African anti-colonial struggle to questions over the threats posed by neo-colonial 
and Cold War influences in a decolonizing continent.5
 By the end of 1960, the so-called ‘year of Africa’, continent-wide independence 
appeared to be a foregone conclusion. yet what that independence would look like 
was still far from clear. In the post-World War II era, the pursuit of greater autonomy 
and self-determination was not only to be a quest for African nationalists on the con-
tinent. rather, the massacre at Sharpeville, coupled with the escalation of the Alge-
rian war in north Africa, signalled a rising commitment among settlers in northern 
and southern Africa to a system of violently enforced minority rule on the continent. 
By the early 1960s these groups of settlers had begun their own experimentation 
with questions of independence in their respective colonies. Additionally, the Congo 
crisis and the assassination of Patrice lumumba confirmed many anti-colonial na-
tionalists’ fears of a new form of colonial intervention on the continent, while also 
solidifying their beliefs in the need to re-conceptualize the African struggle at home 
and abroad.
 The intersections between southern African settler politics, mid-century African 
nationalism, and the Cold War frame this essay and its discussion of the southern 
African experience in the pan-African sphere of nkrumah’s Ghana. The intracta-
ble nature of the white settler state presented nkrumah and his government with 
the unique problem of an apparently stagnating revolution. mau mau and Algeria 
had already shown the world the extent to which settler populations – with, at 
least in part, the support of their metropolitan governments –would go in order to 
3 for one of the most forceful attempts to complicate this narrative of an orderly and democratic transfer of power in Ghana, see 
Jean marie Allman, The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana (madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1993).
4 ‘freedom fighter’ is a popularly used term, dating back to at least the early twentieth century, intended to evoke the just nature 
of one’s political struggle. from the 1950s onward, popular usage of the term expanded rapidly in Africa, particularly among 
communities of anti-colonial activists and opposition parties. Anti-colonial conferences were organized under the auspices of 
being ‘freedom fighter Conferences’, while new periodicals also adopted the term in their titles. Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd 
edition, s.vv. “freedom,” http://www.oed.com/ (Accessed 1 february 2012).
5 See Jean Allman, ‘nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and freedom: Ghana, 1957-1962’, Souls, 10 
(Jan.-mar. 2008), 83-102; meredith Terretta, ‘Cameroonian nationalists Go Global: from forest Maquis to a Pan-African Accra’, 
Journal of African History, 51 (2010), 189-212; Jeffrey S. Ahlman, ‘The Algerian Question in nkrumah’s Ghana, 1958-1960: 
Debating “Violence” and “nonviolence” in African Decolonization’, Africa Today, 57 (Winter 2010), 67-84.
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maintain their privileges within their respective colonies. The brutal massacre of un-
armed protesters in Sharpeville and, five years later, the rhodesian UDI only con-
firmed the inhumane nature of the settler situation for nkrumah and other radical 
politicians. furthermore, a failure of leadership within the international community 
– particularly among the British and American governments (Ghana’s closest trad-
ing partners and benefactors) – forced nkrumah and others to look elsewhere as 
they pursued their envisioned ‘African revolution’ on the continent. The result was a 
political setting that was rife for a radicalizing transnational anti-colonial movement, 
which not only pushed figures like nkrumah further to the political left, but more 
importantly collapsed the international politics of the Cold War into a post-colonial 
worldview haunted by threats of neo-colonial subversion and – as exemplified by the 
southern African situation – the spectre of the continent’s presumed ‘failed’ decolo-
nization.
A Pan-African Accra
Alfred hutchinson’s choice of Ghana was a deliberate one. Internationally the Sec-
ond World War, coupled with the post-War advent of the United nations, had dis-
rupted what Jane Burbank and frederick Cooper have called the ‘world of empires’ 
with promises of a new international order.6 Coming out of the War, for instance, 
much of Asia – including the prized and long-time colonies of the Indian subcon-
tinent and Indonesia – made claims to self-government. Over the next few years, 
the vast majority of these colonies would attain independence, most through rela-
tively peaceful means. The 1955 Bandung Conference further aimed to capitalize 
on the volatility of the post-War international order. Bringing together represen-
tatives from twenty-nine self-governing Asian and African territories, including 
nkrumah’s pre-independence Gold Coast, the Conference created a space for the 
world’s emerging nation-states to demand a place for themselves as equals on the 
international stage. for as Vijay Prashad explains, ‘what is important about Band-
ung is that it allowed these leaders to meet together, celebrate the demise of formal 
colonialism, and pledge themselves to some measure of joint struggle against the 
forces of imperialism.’7
 That decolonization was to be a co-ordinated act of self-expression on the in-
ternational stage drove nkrumah’s worldview. Decolonization, and particularly that 
of Africa, was to be, at least in theory, a co-operative project for nkrumah, one that 
linked the continent’s diverse colonies’ struggles together under the overarching um-
brella of African liberation and African unity. As a result, within days of indepen-
dence nkrumah began the process of establishing Accra as a haven for the continent’s 
anti-colonial nationalists and radicals. Prominent pan-Africanist figures like George 
Padmore and T. ras makonnen joined the new nkrumah administration, first in ad-
visory roles and later in formalized positions. Together, they worked with nkrumah 
to create a vibrant network of formal and informal bases of support for the country’s 
growing expatriate community. returning to london in September 1959 for medical 
6 Jane Burbank and frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 413.
7 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (new york: new Press, 2007), 32. See also Christopher 
J. lee, ‘Between a moment and an era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung’ in lee, ed., Making a World after Empire: The 
Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 14-16.
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attention, Padmore recruited young nationalists eager to continue their education 
in an environment presumably more conducive to their revolutionary ambitions.8 
As one young malawian student, a mr. Bright nyondo, recalled in 1961, it was 
Padmore’s ability to connect the changes taking place in Ghana to the malawian’s 
own country’s anti-colonial struggles that brought nyondo to Accra. According to 
nyondo, ‘I was much impressed by his simplicity, by his sincerity, by his sympathy 
with my efforts to educate myself and, above all, by his great interest in my country 
nyasaland.’9 for this reason, nyondo, like numerous others in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, travelled to Accra and Ghana’s other major cities where (often with some dif-
ficulty) they sought to complete their primary and secondary school education.
 long-time political activists and exiled nationalists accompanied the students 
in Ghana. Buoyed by nkrumah’s promotion of the 1958 Conference of Indepen-
dent African States (CIAS) and, especially, the December 1958 All-African People’s 
Conference (AAPC), exiled party leaders and asylum seekers, like hutchinson, con-
verged upon Accra as they sought a base of support for their respective causes. By 
early 1960 representatives from South Africa, the rhodesias, Tanganyika, Algeria, 
Cameroon and Angola, among other anti-colonial hotspots, were enjoying the pre-
sumed sense of camaraderie that accompanied nkrumah’s pan-African and anti- 
colonial ambitions on the continent. ‘We have arrived home’, Peter molotsi of the 
South African Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) exclaimed as he reminisced about his 
arrival in Accra, ‘the mecca of Pan-Africanism’ in 1960.10
 Institutional support for the country’s anti-colonial community rested with the 
Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs (BAA). founded in 1959 and charged with main-
taining and extending nkrumah’s pan-African message throughout the continent, 
the BAA ran literacy classes and educational campaigns for expatriates, operated 
one of Africa’s largest non-academic research libraries and inter-continental press-
es on African Affairs and, through its subsidiary the African Affairs Centre (AAC), 
ran a hostel service for both elite and non-elite members of the emerging ‘freedom 
fighter’ community.11 moreover, as members of the community arrived in the coun-
try – many coming without papers and money – the BAA and the AAC supplied 
them with visas, clothing, a small stipend, and basic toiletries, while some expatri-
ates also sought additional support for their wives and children.12 meanwhile, those 
who could not make it to Ghana wrote regularly to the Bureau seeking advice and 
moral support as they pursued their revolutionary ambitions from home. for as one 
J.J. maketo of Southern rhodesia explained in a 1961 letter to the Bureau’s director 
A.K. Barden, he privately supported the illegal national Democratic Party (nDP). 
yet out of fear of incarceration and of the loss of his teaching position, he had been 
unable to publicly announce his support for the party. ‘let us say I am dismissed 
from teaching, what can be my possible future?’ maketo asked Barden.13 While the 
8 for an account of Padmore’s experience in Ghana, see James r. hooker, Black Revolutionary: George Padmore’s Path from 
Communism to Pan-Africanism (new york: Praeger Publishers, 1967), chapter 8.
9 George Padmore research library on African Affairs [hereafter, GPrl], Accra, Bureau of African Affairs [BAA]/ research 
library on African Affairs [rlAA]/328, nyondo to minister of education, Accra, 25 October 1961.
10 Peter molotsi quoted in luli Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2004), 
264.
11 On the daily operations of the BAA, see Jeffrey Ahlman, ‘managing the Pan-African Workplace: Discipline, Ideology, and the 
Cultural Politics of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs’, Ghana Studies, forthcoming.
12 Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 6 may 2008; GPrl, BAA/rlAA/328, e.A. Dzima, Interview with A. maurice m’Polo, 26 
September 1961. See also ras makonnen and Kenneth King, Pan-Africanism from Within (london: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 211-25.
13 GPrl, BAA/rlAA/811, maketo to Barden, Bulawayo, Southern rhodesia, 15 november 1961.
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Ghanaian director responded with sympathy to maketo’s plight, he did continue by 
reminding the Southern rhodesian of the all-encompassing role of the anti-colonial 
struggle in shaping one’s life.14
 By 1960, when Ghana made its transition to a republic, the country had thus 
evolved into a central staging ground for anti-colonial activists, exiles and asylum 
seekers on the continent. As in other anti-colonial centres like Cairo and Dar es Sa-
laam, though, expatriates living in Ghana often found it difficult to adjust to or make 
a living within their host country, particularly as interpersonal and inter-agency ri-
valries within their host’s political administration often slowed the distribution of 
services to those most in need.15 nonetheless, in the Ghanaian context, the freedom 
fighter and exile communities played a vital role in presenting the nkrumah govern-
ment’s anti-colonial and non-aligned agenda to a continental and international audi-
ence. During this time, exiled leaders and freedom fighters were regularly carted 
before the public in party rallies. likewise, their exploits dotted the pages of state-run 
and party newspapers, while the military, ideological and logistical training they re-
ceived in government-run training camps assured the nkrumah administration that 
it was playing an active role in the continued liberation and eventual unification of 
the continent at large. even more importantly, Accra’s freedom fighters and expatri-
ates helped colour the ways in which nkrumah and others in his government under-
stood the many-headed hydra of colonial and anti-colonial politics on the continent, 
the settler situation in southern Africa and their place in the bifurcating world of the 
Cold War.
Ghana, Southern African and the Boycott
As international attention to the problem of apartheid intensified in the years be-
tween 1958 and 1961, South African activists and exiles emerged as one of the most 
prominent groups of expatriates in the Accra freedom fighter community and, in 
so doing, injected the city’s anti-colonial politics with a series of conflicts and de-
bates linked to the internal South African political scene. In a continent seemingly 
undergoing a rapid political and social transformation, the racialized rhetoric and 
policies of the South African apartheid state appeared anachronistic. Both in South 
Africa and internationally, activists responded to the policies of the apartheid regime 
with public protests, rallies and newspaper campaigns. In the United Kingdom, for 
instance, the economic boycott emerged as the preferred tool of protest for the British 
left. Working primarily with AnC representatives and others in the South African 
opposition, British politicians and activists – most famously including figures such 
as fenner Brockway of the movement for Colonial freedom and reverend michael 
Scott of the Africa Bureau – presented the boycott as ‘A Great moral and Positive 
Weapon’ against apartheid.16
 for instance, as early as 1957, the pacifist Scott was writing to nkrumah explain-
ing how, for nearly a decade, the South African regime had flaunted international 
14 GPrl, BAA/rlAA/811, Barden to maketo, Accra, 8 January 1962.
15 for examples from the Ghanaian freedom fighter community, see GPrl, BAA/rlAA/328, romance macDonald Kachere, ‘A 
history of myself ’ (Unpublished manuscript), 6 September 1961; GPrl, BAA/rlAA/328, e.A. Dzima, Interview with Bright 
nyondo, 12 September 1961; GPrl, BAA/rlAA/328, e.A. Dzima, Interview with A. maurice m’Polo, 26 September 1961. 
meredith Terretta also notes how certain Cameroonian exiles in Accra had to resort to hawking water in order to make ends 
meet. Terretta, ‘Cameroonian nationalists Go Global’, 206-7.
16 Christabel Gurney, ‘“A Great moral Cause”: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid movement, June 1959-1960’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 26 (mar. 2000), 123-40, quote from 140.
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law and United nations’ resolutions with its racialized worldview. This intransi-
gence, Scott asserted, required a co-ordinated effort among Africa’s independent 
states as they attempted to pressure the international community into isolating and 
ostracizing the Pretoria government. According to Scott, Ghana and West Africa 
more broadly were to ‘set an example [for the world] by boycotting South African 
foodstuffs, eggs, tinned fruit, wine, and other products from the Union.’17 mean-
while, inside South Africa, the AnC promoted a co-ordinated local and interna-
tional boycott of white South African products as the most effective and efficient 
manner in which to challenge the apartheid regime. for as one 1959 AnC national 
Conference report suggested, ‘by withdrawing our purchasing power [approximate-
ly £400,000,000 per annum] from certain institutions we can, as Chief luthuli said, 
“punch them in the stomach.”’18 later that year, another AnC report argued that ‘[t]
he Boycott has the additional merit that it is not a defensive weapon. We are on the 
offensive and we are fighting on a battlefield chosen by ourselves, based on our own 
strength.’ To this end, the report’s authors insisted: ‘The economic boycott in South 
Africa has unlimited potentialities.’ ‘When our local purchasing power is combined 
with that of sympathetic organizations overseas,’ the report continued, ‘we wield a 
devastating weapon.’19
 Support for the boycott did not go uncontested, however, in either South Africa 
or the international community. The American and British governments actively 
dissuaded the protest movement dismissing it as, at best, a movement of naïve and 
idealistic activists and, at worst, a program open to communist infiltration.20 fur-
thermore, inside South Africa, the AnC was fracturing with the so-called ‘African-
ists’, guided by robert Sobukwe and Potlako leballo, breaking away from the orga-
nization in order to form their own party. frustrated by what they saw as the AnC’s 
misguided faith in multi-racialism, the leaders of the newly formed PAC set their 
sights on building relationships with anti-colonial nationalists and pan-Africanist 
radicals in other parts of the continent.21 meanwhile, locally, the PAC promoted the 
boycott as a means by which to protest against abusive shopkeepers, while interna-
tionally it ‘supported and encouraged’ African countries to join the struggle. how-
ever, as Christabel Gurney shows, the boycott was never a central feature of PAC 
policy. rather, PAC leaders viewed it as a passive and ultimately ineffectual response 
to the white-run government.22
 The call for a boycott of South African goods put the nkrumah government in a 
difficult position. At the 1958 AAPC, the continent’s nationalist leaders had unequiv-
ocally supported the action with the Conference’s governing body writing the boycott 
into the event’s resolutions.23 The siting of the AAPC’s Permanent Secretariat in Accra 
17 michael Scott, ‘memorandum to Dr. nkrumah, 1957: South Africa Versus the Conscience of the World’, reproduced in Scott, A 
Time to Speak (new york: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), 341.
18 ‘report of the national Anti-Pass Council. Signed by Duma nokwe, Secretary-General of the AnC, Submitted to the “mass 
national Conference” of may 30, 1959,’ quoted in Thomas Karis and Gwendolen m. Carter, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, vol. 3 (Stanford: hoover Institution Press, 1977), 292.
19 ‘report of the national executive Committee of the AnC, Submitted to the Annual Conference, December 12-13, 1959’, 
reproduced in Tom Karis and Gail Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge, 472.
20 Gurney, ‘“A Great Cause,”’ 142. On the American side some anti-apartheid activists even questioned the efficacy and wisdom of 
boycotts. rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the 
United States, c. 1919-64 (new york: Palgrave macmillan, 2011), 163-4.
21 On the PAC, see Kwandiwe Kondlo, In the Twilight of Revolution: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959-1994 
(Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009).
22 Gurney, ‘“A Great Cause’”, 127-8.
23 All-African People’s Conference: Accra, 5th-13th December, 1958: Conference resolution on Imperialism and Colonialism 
(Accra: Government Printers, [1958?]), 9.
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put even more pressure on nkrumah and his Cabinet to conform to the Conference’s 
resolutions as they devised the new state’s foreign policy. The nkrumah government, 
however, hedged its bets as international interests and instrumental concerns sub-
verted anti-colonial activism and perceived burgeoning continental solidarity. Seek-
ing to soften his image outside of Africa from that of a radical revolutionary to one of 
a responsible statesman, nkrumah appeared to many to have sided with the British 
and American governments in debates over the ‘South African Question.’ Suggest-
ing at the 1957 Commonwealth Prime ministers’ Conference that key international 
forums such as Commonwealth meetings were not ideal for debates over apartheid, 
nkrumah promoted a passive approach in dealing with the South African govern-
ment, one that emphasized the international collective’s ability to encourage the 
apartheid regime into a gradual softening of its policies.24 This hands-off approach 
to South Africa also had repercussions at home in Ghana as, in an attempt to protect 
what it saw as its growing influence in the international community, the nkrumah 
administration openly chastised elements within its own political wings for advocat-
ing the boycott in the press and on the radio.25
 Domestic interests also featured prominently in the Ghanaian reaction to the 
proposed South African boycott. rapid development and industrial modernization 
was integral to the envisioned nkrumahist way of life. Inside Ghana, nkrumah en-
visaged a wholesale re-invention of Ghanaian industry, commerce and infrastruc-
ture. Still unrivalled today, his plans included investments in transportation, elec-
trification, telecommunication, agriculture, education and healthcare. This state-run 
infrastructural and industrial program was to fuel economic expansion and ensure 
the country’s political and economic independence.26 yet Ghanaian modernization 
required substantial (primarily western) subsidies. furthermore, the hallmark of 
nkrumah’s development agenda – the Volta river Project – was inextricably linked 
to British and, after 1957, American capital. Initially conceived as a joint British-Gold 
Coast endeavour, the Volta river Project aimed to dam Ghana’s largest river and, in 
so doing, electrify large swaths of West Africa, transform Ghana into a leader in the 
international aluminium market and create the world’s largest man-made lake.27 As 
British interest in the project waned after independence, nkrumah turned his atten-
tion to the Americans who cautiously signalled their interest in contributing a $600 
million loan to the dam initiative. Over the next several years, a ‘cat and mouse game’ 
developed between nkrumah and his American benefactors as nkrumah sought to 
secure the promised investment with a public moderation of key aspects of his anti-
colonial and international agenda.28
 The inconsistencies between nkrumah’s rhetoric and actions were a cause of 
consternation throughout the continental anti-colonial community. for instance, 
24 W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), 42-3.
25 Public records and Archives Administration [PrAAD]-Accra, Administrative files [ADm] 13/1/28, Cabinet minutes, 4 August 
1959.
26 for recent work on nkrumah-era modernization projects, see Peter J. Bloom, Takyiwaa manuh and Stephan f. miescher, eds., 
Special Issue: revisiting modernization, Ghana Studies, 12/13 (2009/2010); Ahlman, ‘living with nkrumahism: nation, State, 
and Pan-Africanism in Ghana’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2011); Kate Skinner, ‘Who Knew the 
minds of the People?: Specialist Knowledge and Developmentalist Authoritarianism in Postcolonial Ghana’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 39 (2011), 297-323.
27 On the Volta river Project, see David hart, The Volta River Project: A Case Study in Politics and Technology (edinburgh: edinburgh 
University Press, 1980); miescher and Dzodzi Tsikata, ‘hydro-Power and the Promise of modernity and Development in Ghana: 
Comparing the Akosombo and Bui Dam Projects’, Ghana Studies, 12/13 (2009/2010), 15-53. 
28 On the Ghanaian-American negotiations, see ebere nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960 
(rochester: University of rochester Press, 2001), chapter 6.
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nkrumah’s unwillingness to support the South African boycott was a subject of wide-
spread debate at the 1960 AAPC in Tunis. ‘Speakers after speakers [sic] directly and 
indirectly attacked Ghana on its lukewarm policy towards the boycotting of South Af-
rican goods,’ A.K. Barden complained in his post-Conference report to nkrumah.29 
The solution for him was obvious. Barden continued by explaining, ‘I feel that in order 
to uphold the envious prestige of Ghana in its relentless fight for independence for 
dependent African countries this matter should be given further consideration.’30 A 
week later in early february 1960, another memo – this time presented to the Ghanaian 
African Affairs Committee – outlined the importance of the boycott to the South 
African cause, while also offering a path by which Ghana could become compliant 
with popular opinion.31 According to the author (an unnamed former South African 
diplomat visiting Accra), with strikes illegal and the government’s increasingly indis-
criminate arrests of Africans, boycotts proved the only real weapon for the country’s 
African peoples in their struggles against the apartheid regime. The ‘internationalisa-
tion’ of the boycott was thus vital to the future of South Africa, the author argued, 
for a ‘full’ and ‘total’ boycott would strike at the heart of all of the apartheid state’s 
most ardent supporters: the industries, farmers and, presumably, the politicians. As 
such, the author called upon the Ghanaian government to offer ‘immediate support 
from all unofficial sources for the boycott’ and, within six months, to announce its 
official support and participation in the protest movement. Additionally, the author 
insisted that any attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the South African re-
gime should be reconsidered so that Ghana may lead a ‘diplomatic offensive’ against 
the apartheid government in Accra and in the United nations.32
 The result was a tepid and inconsistent approach to the boycott beginning in early 
1960. Key South African goods were banned from importation, curiously including 
the prominent anti-apartheid Drum magazine. Additionally, South African nationals 
were required to denounce the apartheid regime prior to entering the country.33 ex-
emptions abounded, however. J.f.V. Philips – a white South African professor at the 
University College of Ghana – for instance, was given special dispensation to return 
to the country in August 1960 in order to settle his affairs despite being ‘unable to 
make the declaration against apartheid’.34 furthermore, as late as at least 1964, some 
trade continued between the two countries, primarily through the Ghanaian-owned 
Black Star line shipping company.35 As a result, by late 1960 frustrated officials in 
nkrumah’s own Cabinet were arguing for a rethinking of the boycott and labelling it 
‘virtually ineffective’.36
 meanwhile, as the Ghanaian government debated the role and framework of the 
boycott in the country’s foreign policy, the AnC and PAC each battled to position 
themselves as the legitimate voice of the South African movement in Accra. Speaking 
for the AnC, Alfred hutchinson attempted to use the contacts he had made at the 
1958 AAPC and in Accra’s freedom fighter community to delegitimize the PAC in 
29 PrAAD-Accra, SC/BAA/251 (rG 17/1/465), Barden, ‘report on the 2nd All-African People’s Conference held in Tunis on 25th 
January, 1960’, 2 february 1960. emphasis in original. This collection is currently in the process of being renumbered from SC/
BAA/- to rG 17/1/-. When possible, I will provide the information for both cataloguing systems.
30 Ibid.
31 PrAAD-Accra, SC/BAA/251 (rG 17/1/465), ‘memorandum on South Africa’, Appendix to ‘11th meeting of the African Affairs 
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the halls of the Ghanaian government. Characterizing the PAC as a party comprised 
of ‘radicals’ and ‘extremists’, hutchinson presented the longstanding AnC as South 
Africa’s sole responsible alternative; it was only the AnC, he and others suggested, 
that was ready and willing to work with anyone – African, european, or otherwise 
– committed to advancing the South African struggle.37 PAC leaders, for their part, 
began to make their way out of South Africa in early 1960. led by Peter molotsi and 
nana mahomo, who left South Africa together on 20 march 1960 just a day before 
the Sharpeville massacre, the PAC set up missions in Accra, Dar es Salaam, Cairo, 
london and in several other metropolitan and extra-metropolitan locales.38 PAC 
leaders would come to play an active role in the Accra freedom fighter commu-
nity, as they worked for institutions such as the BAA and lobbied the nkrumah gov-
ernment for financial and military support.39 As such, by the end of 1960, they had 
become some of the most influential exiles in Accra, moulding nkrumah’s and the 
Ghanaian government’s understandings not only of events in South Africa, but also 
and perhaps more importantly, of the issues shaping the southern African region as 
a whole.
Sharpeville, the PAC and the ANC in Accra
The massacre at Sharpeville was a turning point in the Ghanaian understanding of 
the South African conflict. On 21 march 1960, during an anti-pass rally organized by 
the PAC, South African police officials opened fire on a crowd of unarmed protest-
ers in the township of Sharpeville, killing sixty-nine people and wounding approxi-
mately two hundred others. The international response to the incident was vehe-
ment. even some of the South African government’s most reliable allies felt as if they 
had no choice but to reproach the apartheid regime. Speaking from Washington, for 
instance, the eisenhower administration’s Director of the Office of news, lincoln 
White, insisted – albeit to the furore of the President himself – that the ‘United States 
deplores violence in all its forms’ and that ‘it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of 
life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa.’40 
Broadly, British reactions to the massacre followed a similar tone with eighty percent 
of respondents to a Gallup poll describing themselves ‘appalled’ by apartheid after the 
incident.41 likewise, in Parliament prominent mPs condemned the apartheid gov-
ernment on the floor of the house of Commons, comparing it to a ‘thinly disguised 
[system of] slavery’.42 As a result, by the middle of the following year, South Africa 
would leave the Commonwealth, further weakening its connection to Britain and the 
other former settler states that historically dominated the institution.
 Inside Ghana, the events in Sharpeville came at a time when the nkrumah gov-
ernment was finalizing preparations for the 1960 Positive Action Conference in 
Accra. The conference, named after nkrumah’s own evolving philosophy of non-
violent resistance, was to co-ordinate and organize nationalists and the Accra-based 
freedom fighter community around issues including french nuclear testing in the 
37 PrAAD-Accra, SC/BAA/251 (rG 17/1/465), ‘minutes of the 5th meeting of the African Affairs Committee held on november 
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Sahara, the french-Algerian War and the continued need to educate the African pop-
ulace in the promises of African unity.43 The events in Sharpeville brought the South 
African Question to the forefront of the conference’s agenda. As a result, in the two 
and half weeks between Sharpeville and the early April conference, the nkrumah-
led Convention People’s Party (CPP) inundated the Ghanaian press with stories of 
the massacre and of rallies protesting the violence of the apartheid regime. Political 
cartoonist ‘Samco’, publishing in the 26 march edition of the party-run Evening News, 
perhaps best illustrated the Ghanaian interpretation of apartheid post-Sharpeville. 
his cartoon featured an image of a minister and settlers shooting at black South Af-
ricans under the caption: ‘Watch the Bible and not my Actions’ (see figure 1).44 An-
other columnist, also in the Evening News, added that Sharpeville proved that the 
only course of action for Africa was that of ‘the full implementation of the United 
States of Africa’ and the ‘vigorous boycott of South African goods’.45
 Sharpeville radicalized nkrumah himself. In early 1960, his faith in the ‘Ghana-
ian’ model of decolonization was already beginning to sour. In nkrumah’s mind, as 
the so-called ‘year of Africa’ began to take shape, political compromise and negotia-
tion were proving too uncertain a path to the political independence the Ghana-
ian leader desired. This was particularly evident in his view of francophone Africa, 
where nkrumah believed that a set of puppet governments controlled from Paris 
were subverting the nationalist ambitions of the countries’ ‘true’ anti-colonial par-
43 GPrl, BAA/rlAA/467, ‘Speech by the rt. hon. Kwame nkrumah, Prime minister of Ghana, at the Opening Session of the 
Conference of Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa on Thursday, 7th April 1960.’
44 ‘Samco’, ‘Watch the Bible and not my Actions’, Evening News, 26 march 1960.
45 Zep, ‘U.S. of Africa the Only Cure’, Evening News, 26 march 1960.
figure 1: ‘Samco’, Evening News, 26 march 1960.
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ties.46 In other locales, particularly in southern and north Africa, settler rule was 
proving increasingly intractable, initiating a gradual rethinking of the methods of 
anti-colonial resistance.47 meanwhile, in newly independent countries like Ghana, 
nkrumah and his officials argued that neo-colonial interests, primarily associated 
with the United States and its allies, aimed to subvert the political independence 
these states had already achieved and thus disrupt the broader goal of continental 
unity.48 The extractive nature of monopoly capital and the brewing battle between 
the Cold War powers for position on the continent further cultivated this not al-
together too far-fetched view of continental affairs in the early 1960s. As a result, 
questions of neo-colonialism, foreign subversion, sabotage and political infiltration 
dominated the nkrumahist scene in the first years of the new decade. In response 
to this uncertain future, the nkrumah administration intensified its policing of po-
litical dissidents and began its exploration into the possibilities and promise of the 
one-party state.49
 The shifts in Ghanaian domestic and foreign policy did not go unnoticed by South 
African expatriates in Accra, or in their offices across the continent. Among the AnC 
elite, few felt comfortable with the changes taking place in their West African host 
country.50 Ghanaian flirtations with the one-party state and the arrests of political 
dissidents signalled a threat to democracy in what many had once considered the 
beacon of the new Africa. furthermore, many chided, if not outright ridiculed, the 
cult of personality that was developing around nkrumah. At the same time, class 
distinctions between the AnC activists in Accra and their Ghanaian hosts also exac-
erbated tensions between the AnC and CPP.51 As a result, the consensus in the AnC 
was that it needed to look elsewhere on the continent for support, with figures as 
prominent as nelson mandela privately lamenting that the Ghanaian anti-colonial 
apparatus had ‘turned out to be something quite contrary to what it was meant to 
be’.52 By 1962 the AnC’s continental focus had thus shifted to cities such as Dar es 
Salaam and lusaka – locales that made greater logistical and political sense in regards 
to the AnC struggle – as well as to Algiers, rabat, and Cairo.53 moreover, as the AnC 
looked elsewhere, the Ghanaians did the same, focusing on the AnC’s rivals as they 
continued to try and exert their influence over the South African scene.
 Despite periodic frustrations with the Ghanaian establishment, the PAC retained 
its commitment to the Ghanaian anti-colonial scene. molotsi, mahomo and leballo 
played the most prominent roles in Accra, meeting with CPP leaders and writing 
about the PAC and life under apartheid for the Ghanaian press.54 Peter raboroko fur-
ther added to the PAC mission in Accra when, in 1961, he joined the staff of the BAA 
for an, at times, turbulent tenure as an associate editor for the institution’s flagship 
magazine – Voice of Africa.55 raboroko, a founding member of the PAC executive 
46 for nkrumah’s analysis of francophone Africa, see nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (london: Panaf, 1963), 174-9.
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Committee and the party’s Secretary of education, presented the magazine’s local and 
continental readerships with accounts of the conflict in South Africa, but also with 
stories of the struggles in neighbouring territories, such as those of the Portuguese 
colonies, rwanda and Burundi.56 furthermore, as the Ghanaian-PAC relationship 
reached its height between 1961 and 1963, nkrumah organized arms and money for 
the PAC and its military-wing Poqo, including the 1962 purchase of a £124,000 arms-
laden Swedish freighter. Unfortunately for the South African ‘Africanists’ though, the 
freighter never arrived at its destination on the Transkei coast as, according to former 
PAC activist Bernard leeman, it was widely believed to have been sold for profit by a 
corrupt PAC official prior to its arrival.57
 The foundation of the Ghanaian-PAC relationship was a shared worldview. The 
PAC spoke to the nkrumahist ambitions and ideologies in a way the AnC, with its 
commitment to multi-racialism, could not. Throughout the continent, nkrumah 
preached the edict of ‘Africa for Africans’. Both South African parties surely agreed 
with this principle, yet the PAC articulated its demands in a way that resonated more 
forcefully with the nkrumahist administration. having little experience with the 
phenomenon of ‘the settler’, the question of who was ‘African’ was clear from the 
perspective of Accra; the ‘African’ in South Africa was black; even the South Afri-
can Coloured community’s position remained ambiguous in the Ghanaian imagina-
tion. more to the point though, Afrikaner, english and other europeans’ claims to an 
‘African-ness’ were suspect at best for the Ghanaians and, in terms of the country’s 
‘decolonization’, had to remain understated. The AnC may not have disagreed, yet 
the more nuanced, multi-racial approach it took to the South African situation fell 
on deaf ears in a radicalizing Ghana as the nkrumah regime failed to appreciate the 
social and racial dimensions of what a liberated South Africa would look like. The 
PAC, in contrast, offered a clearer view of a future South Africa, at least from the 
perspective of Accra, as it combined an unabashed pan-African racial philosophy 
with a willingness to speak to questions of neo-colonialism and even tolerate the at 
times unpleasant steps required to fight against it at home and abroad. even as the 
PAC – like its AnC rivals – shifted its political gaze towards the extra-metropolitan 
hotspots of the southeast, the PAC maintained and continued to cultivate its relation-
ship with the Accra government up until the 1966 coup overthrowing the nkrumah 
regime.58 moreover, the PAC did so even though its relationship with the nkrumah 
government produced only modest amounts of real material and monetary support 
for the South African cause.
Ghana, South African and Southern Rhodesia
from the perspective of Accra, the post-Sharpeville world required a new, more 
forceful approach to not only the South African problem, but that of all of southern 
Africa. Inside South Africa, the apartheid government responded to the incident in 
Sharpeville with a radical crackdown on African political activities in the country. 
Both the AnC and the PAC were banned and the majority of the two parties’ leaders 
56 See, for instance, Peter raboroko, ‘Dark Clouds Over mozambique: Slave labour Camps and Union mines’, Voice of Africa 
(September 1961); raboroko, ‘ruanda-Urundi Struggle for freedom’, Voice of Africa (may 1962).
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58 In fact, at the time of the 1966 coup, PAC Acting President Potlako leballo was in Ghana and, for up to a week after the coup, his 
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were imprisoned or exiled. Those who remained often became embroiled in leader-
ship disputes and personal conflicts that threatened the continued viability of the 
anti-apartheid movement, particularly within the PAC.59 meanwhile, internationally, 
the conflict between the PAC and the AnC came to a head in the year and a half fol-
lowing Sharpeville with both organizations’ leaders calling for an end to their short-
lived post-Sharpeville alliance – the South African United front. As Scott Thomas ar-
gues, by march 1962 the remaining AnC leadership had realized that, with the PAC’s 
persistent attempts ‘to vilify[] and belittl[e]’ the movement, the alliance proved un-
sustainable.60 Thomas adds that PAC officials for their part saw little use in continu-
ing with an alliance that required compromises that the young party was unprepared 
to make. According to Thomas, it was generally felt that the PAC simply needed the 
time and space to assert its own identity on the political stage.61 As a result, by the 
time the dust had settled following Sharpeville, observers both inside and outside 
South Africa now feared that the apartheid government was more entrenched than 
it had ever been.
 On the continental level, worries over apartheid’s possible spread grew. In South 
West Africa, for instance, a search for more efficient methods by which to control 
the mandate’s African population paved the way for a new set of ethnically and ra-
cially engineered land reform projects in the early and mid-1960s.62 To the east in 
Southern rhodesia, the situation was even more problematic. The so-called 1960 
‘march of 7,000’ from highfield to Salisbury had elicited a vitriolic reaction from 
the Southern rhodesian government, leading to the passage of the law and Order 
(maintenance) Act later that year. not only did the Act promise to bring multi-year 
imprisonments to those engaged in nearly all forms of political protest, the Act also 
gave the Attorney-General the right to appeal for harsher punishments if he saw fit. 
Additionally, under the Act’s provisions, the minister of Justice gained the author-
ity to indiscriminately ban publications, while the police could now disrupt public 
gatherings (without cause) and arrest their attendees.63 furthermore, in 1961 the 
signing of the new constitution ensured minority rule in the colony for at least the 
foreseeable future. A year later, with the formation and election of the secession-
ist rhodesian front (rf), white rhodesians again sought to reset the terms of the 
debate as they now shifted their emphasis from the protection of the minority-led 
government to the pursuit of white-led self-rule. According to Ian Smith, ‘A political 
awareness had suddenly gripped rhodesians [in late 1962], as there was a general 
feeling that the hour had come, and that if they did not arouse themselves they were 
going to lose their country altogether.’64
 Ghanaian interest in the rhodesian Question dated back to at least 1958, when 
Joshua nkomo presented the rhodesian cause to the AAPC and served on the confer-
ence’s steering committee.65 likewise, from his teaching post at the Takoradi Teacher 
Training College, robert mugabe also advocated for rhodesia in the Ghanaian free-
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dom fighter community.66 moreover, after Barden’s 1960 appointment to the Bureau 
of African Affairs’ directorship, Ghanaian initiatives in Southern rhodesia – like 
most other anti-colonial hotspots – intensified as he and his lieutenants embarked 
upon fact-finding missions to the region, provided scholarships for rhodesians to 
attend primary and secondary schools in Ghana and, after its 1962 establishment, 
invited them to participate in the activities of the Kwame nkrumah Ideological In-
stitute in the coastal town of Winneba.67 here rhodesian expatriates joined other 
freedom fighters and a select group of Ghanaians for both vocational and ideologi-
cal training in the advancement of the nkrumahist revolution, with certain students 
also receiving training in organizational strategies, propagandizing, the art of ‘posi-
tive action’ and party politics.68 meanwhile, more prominent rhodesian expatriates 
established residences and party offices in Accra.69
 following the lead of the PAC and other successfully established anti-colonial 
parties in Accra, the leaders of the national Democratic Party (nDP) and, after its 
1961 formation, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) strove to work with-
in the political and ideological constraints of the Ghanaian anti-colonial arena. In 
the BAA, for instance, ndabaningi Sithole emerged as a prominent writer for Voice 
of Africa, where he commented on issues ranging from questions over the limited 
viability of a continued, strict reliance on non-violence in the rhodesian struggle 
to discussions of the potential benefits of the one-party apparatus in Africa – a pet 
project of nkrumah’s in the early 1960s.70 In 1963, as ZAPU split with the formation 
of the Zimbabwe African national Union (ZAnU), the Ghanaians – like they did 
with the AnC-PAC divide – favoured the newly created party. In the rhodesian in-
stance, though, the Ghanaian action was likely less ideological than personal in that 
prominent ZAnU leaders, including Sithole and S.G. Parirewa, had stronger con-
nections to Ghanaian policymakers than their ZAPU rivals – the most notable being 
nkomo. moreover, ZAnU Secretary-General robert mugabe’s wife, Sally hayfron 
(mugabe), hailed from Ghana’s Western region. Politically active herself, hayfron, 
who left Ghana for rhodesia prior to her 1961 marriage, only returned to her home 
country in 1961 so as to avoid arrest after attempting to organize women against the 
settler regime.71 following her return, hayfron would regularly write to the BAA and 
the ZAnU officials in Accra from her home in the coastal city of Sekondi, relating to 
them information given to her by her husband. These letters often included personal 
discussions of the morale, health and state of mind of ZAnU and ZAPU officials 
detained by the rhodesian government.72
 As with other exile and expatriate communities in Ghana, the rhodesian na-
tionalists coloured nkrumah’s and his administration’s understanding of the evolving 
crisis in the territory. echoing other African leaders and governments, nkrumahist 
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officials regularly painted the crisis as an internationalization of apartheid politics. In 
the international arena, Alex Quaison-Sackey often led the way. Speaking in 1961, for 
instance, Quaison-Sackey – the leading Ghanaian diplomat to the United nations – 
utilized his position in new york to construct a narrative surrounding rhodesia that 
connected what he portrayed as British and settler duplicity in the colony to the ever-
changing nature of capitalist imperialism on the continent. According to Quaison-
Sackey, through the ‘farce’ of the 1961 Constitution, both the governments of White-
hall and Salisbury had proven that they desired little more than to ‘turn the territory 
into another South Africa’.73 Two years later, the Ghanaians again approached the 
United nations for assistance in rhodesia, this time with an eighty-four-page memo-
randum addressed to the Security Council detailing the settler government’s atroci-
ties in the territory.74 The following year, the Ghanaian ministry of foreign Affairs 
added a sixteen-page pamphlet entitled Britain’s Responsibility in Southern Rhodesia 
to its indictment of both the Salisbury and Whitehall governments.75
 The goal of the Ghanaians was to pressure the British into re-establishing di-
rect control over the territory – a policy not seen since 1923 – and committing the 
colony to an accelerated path to majority rule. British officials, for their part, were 
torn about how to proceed. The Ghanaian criticism frustrated them, partly be-
cause it increased nkrumah’s international prestige at a time when many in Britain 
and the United States increasingly sought to isolate him due to his presumed and 
real sympathies with their Cold War rivals: the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent 
China.76 furthermore, many in the British government did desire an eventual path to 
majority rule in rhodesia, even though most also believed that special considerations 
had to be made due to the size of the settler population if they were to guard against 
potential violence or disorder.77 This view, however, was not enough for nkrumah or 
the Ghanaian anti-colonial establishment as they labelled Britain’s rhodesian policy 
neo-colonial and racist. Additionally, settler politics disrupted British ambitions for 
the territory. Viewing its first Prime minister – Winston field – as weak, the rf gov-
ernment replaced field with his hard-line deputy, Ian Smith, in 1964. Under Smith, 
the rf would only amplify its demands for immediate independence, while, as Sue 
Onslow has shown, also secretly build up South African support for its bid for self-
government.78 Within months of Smith’s promotion, it had thus become clear that a 
political solution to the rhodesian crisis was not within sight.
Nkrumah, Britain and the Rhodesian UDI
At precisely 1.15 p.m. on 11 november 1965, Ian Smith, speaking via the rhodesian 
Broadcasting Corporation, announced to the rhodesian people the settler govern-
ment’s decision to unilaterally declare independence from Great Britain. The action 
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was not entirely unexpected. Observers in Africa and Great Britain had been antici-
pating some form of proclamation for months. for instance, as early as April 1965, 
Smith had begun arguing that Southern rhodesia would not suffer as a result of a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).79 furthermore, in the week prior to 
the Declaration, the British Governor in Salisbury had been ‘forewarned’ of the act as 
Smith sought the authority to implement a state of emergency in the then ‘extremely 
quite’ territory.80 from london, British Prime minister harold Wilson pronounced 
the Declaration illegal. Wilson added to his repudiation of the settler government’s 
decision a ban on tobacco and sugar purchases from the southern African territory, 
which at the time comprised 70% of Southern rhodesian trade with the United King-
dom. Among other sanctions, he also announced the termination of all aid to the 
new ‘state’ and its removal from the sterling zone. furthermore, Wilson immediately 
dispatched his foreign minister to new york who insisted that the United nations 
take up the issue on the following day.81
 As might be expected, the continental reaction to the rhodesian UDI was one of 
outrage. In Accra, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had just concluded its 
1965 meeting of heads of state, which had included virulent denunciations of both 
the British and settler governments when the rhodesian announcement was made.82 
Throughout the previous year, the nkrumahist press had dedicated itself to painting 
a picture of Smith as a violent, racist ‘monster’. for those in the nkrumah administra-
tion, the UDI only confirmed their beliefs. Thus, as they searched for a response to 
the rhodesian action, nkrumah, among others in the radical contingent of the OAU, 
demanded nothing less than military intervention. for in its statement on the UDI, 
the Ghanaians welcomed the involvement of the Security Council in the rhodesian 
crisis, yet chided the British for limiting the Council’s actions to economic sanctions 
and for its past indifference in regards to the situation in its territorial possession. 
‘The permanent members of the Security Council’, the Ghanaians argued in their 
statement on the UDI, ‘had quite sufficient forces at their disposal to destroy the 
rhodesian air force and army in a matter of minutes.’ What was missing, the state-
ment concluded, was the will.83 
 Two weeks later in the Ghanaian national Assembly, nkrumah continued his 
assault on British and Security Council sanctions, portraying them as ‘unrealistic’ 
and as an economic burden on the independent African states that neighboured 
rhodesia.84 The only solution, nkrumah argued, was the mobilization of an interna-
tional (African-led) force against the settler government. As a result and in anticipa-
tion of potential military action against the rhodesian settlers, the Ghanaian armed 
forces were ordered to cancel all military leave beginning on 26 november and sol-
diers were told to prepare ‘for any military eventuality’.85
 Over the next two and a half weeks, Ghana’s relations with Britain soured rap-
idly. By the first week of December, key Ghanaian embassies in central and eastern 
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Africa were reporting to Accra about growing numbers of ‘nationalists … wish[ing] 
to volunteer for rhodesia’. ‘[T]his offer’, embassy officials argued, ‘merits serious 
attention’.86 meanwhile, at the OAU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, in what W. Scott 
Thompson perhaps patronizingly describes as a ‘gust of emotion’, the OAU’s Council 
of ministers passed a resolution demanding that, if Britain did not quell the re-
bellion in rhodesia by 15 December, the governments of the independent states 
of Africa would cut diplomatic ties with london.87 As the fifteenth approached, 
nkrumah sent a letter to harold Wilson announcing his intention to comply with 
the OAU resolution.88 On 16 December, with no reaction from london, nkrumah 
again stood before the Ghanaian national Assembly: this time to proclaim the dis-
solution of diplomatic relations between Ghana and Great Britain, and Ghana’s 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth.89
Conclusion
 
nkrumah was the only African head of state to honour the OAU’s resolution and 
break diplomatic relations with Britain. At the time, it appeared to be a tragic end to 
a transcontinental relationship that dated back to the mid-nineteenth century. more 
importantly, in Ghana, it signalled the culmination of an anti-western worldview that 
had its origins in the aftermath of Sharpeville as well as in the concomitant escalation 
of the french-Algerian War and the assassination of Patrice lumumba. By the time 
of the rhodesian UDI in late 1965, nkrumah was no longer willing to put his faith in 
an international community controlled by what he deemed to be neo-colonial inter-
ests. The usefulness of this community, nkrumah argued, had run its course and he 
and the Ghanaian people would now be forced to set their sights elsewhere – towards 
a locale and international model yet to be determined. The search for this interna-
tional alternative, however, was short lived. By the end of february 1966, nkrumah 
and his government would be overthrown in an American-supported military coup 
led by soldiers who, at least in part, were protesting their potential deployment to 
rhodesia.90 following the coup, most of the country’s freedom fighters and expatri-
ates, including those from the PAC, ZAnU and the country’s other remaining south-
ern African expatriates, were arrested and ultimately expelled from the country. The 
new military government was quick to re-establish diplomatic relations with Britain 
and repair its ties with the United States.
 meredith Terretta has recently described Accra under nkrumahist rule as a key 
site for ‘extra-metropolitan’ cosmopolitanism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was 
in places like Accra, Conakry and Algiers, among others, she argues, that dissidents 
and disenfranchised groups could explore their envisioned ‘political alternatives’ as 
colonial rule came to an end on the continent.91 But the Ghanaian experience with 
southern African politics suggests that Accra was more than just a meeting site for an-
ti-colonial rebels and visionaries. It was the embodiment of a unique moment where 
African post-colonial ambitions intersected with the ‘possibilities and constraints’ 
86 GPrl, BAA/rlAA/385, GhAnAemB Bujumbura to Kojo Botsio, Alex Quaison-Sackey, and e. Ofori-Bah, Bujumbura, 
Burundi, 7 December 1965.
87 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 393. Also, see Klaas van Walraven, Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African 
Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1964-1993 (Aldershot, england: Ashgate Publishing limited, 1999), 222.
88 nkrumah to Wilson, 11 December 1965 in nkrumah, Rhodesia file, 119-120.
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90 A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, 24th February 1966 (london: frank Cass and Company, 1967), 104-5.
91 Terretta, ‘Cameroonian nationalists Go Global’, esp. 211-2.
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– to paraphrase frederick Cooper – defining the period of African decolonization.92 
These ambitions included the breaking of the recalcitrance of the white settler state 
on the continent, the disruption of the apparent internationalization of apartheid, 
and the development of methods with which to unsettle the growing threat of the 
Cold War. leaders and supporters of the AnC, PAC, nDP, ZAnU and ZAPU did not 
necessarily come to Accra because it was politically efficient. They came and, for the 
most part, stayed because Accra internationalized their struggles in a way that few 
other ‘extra-metropolitan’ locales could. The city represented a path to inclusion in 
a continental and, at times, global movement set on defining an international order 
independent of the former imperial powers and the bifurcated world of the super-
powers.93
 The dynamism of this moment ended with nkrumah’s overthrow – in Ghana and 
on the continent as a whole. for by the mid-1960s, the vision of a transcontinental 
struggle and African revolution had faded from the rhetoric of even the continent’s 
most iconic remaining leaders – most notably Sékou Touré and Gamal nasser. na-
tional concerns trumped continental issues in their fledgling states. likewise, figures 
like Alfred hutchinson, brought to Ghana by the hope and enthusiasm of the late 
1950s, moved on. hutchinson himself moved onto Great Britain in the early 1960s 
after serving several years as a teacher in his adopted Ghana.94 meanwhile, the battle 
for southern Africa continued unabated with the AnC and PAC firmly establish-
ing themselves in lusaka, Dar es Salaam and maputo, among other strategic locales. 
likewise, in rhodesia the conflict between the settler government and nationalist 
forces rapidly escalated after the UDI, resulting in a brutal civil war that culminat-
ed in the formation of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980. While inter-African and 
transcontinental alliances persisted after the fall of the ‘Pan-African Accra’, unlike in 
the southern African nationalist parties’ turbulent time in the Ghanaian capital, the 
promise of an African revolution had been diverted.
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